Tuesday, March 06, 2007

Pre-emptive [Bill] Strike

TPM Muckraker:

Webb Introduces Bill Restricting War with Iran

Ever since Sen. Jim Webb (D-VA) asked Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice in a Senate committee hearing whether it was the view of the administration that it had the authority to invade Iran without provocation or congressional authorization, we've been watching to see if he got an answer.

“On the one hand, the Administration assures us that it has no intention of launching military operations against Iran. On the other, the Administration tells us that all options remain on the table, at a time when our military buildup in the region continues to grow rapidly. And while we see encouraging new diplomatic initiatives with respect to Iraq, it is important that we clarify, formally, the perimeter of our immediate military interests in the Middle East.

“It is time, Mr. President, that we move forward to end our military involvement in Iraq, and the path to doing so is not to widen the war into Iran. Proper, robust diplomacy will enable us to bring greater stability to the region, to remove the American military from Iraq, to increase our ability to defeat the forces of international terrorism, and, finally, to focus on the true strategic challenges that face us around the world.

“I believe the American people will welcome this legislation. This Administration has used force recklessly, choosing the military option again and again while never matching the quality of our military’s performance with robust, creative diplomacy. Furthermore, the President’s “signing statement” accompanying the 2002 congressional resolution authorizing the use of force in Iraq indicates that this Administration believes it possesses the broadest imaginable authority to commence military action without the consent of the Congress.

“In signing the 2002 Iraq resolution, the President denied that the Congress has the power to affect his decisions when it comes to the use of our military. He shrugged off this resolution, stating that on the question of the threat posed by Iraq, his views and those of the Congress merely happened to be the same. He characterized the resolution as simply a gesture of additional support, rather than as having any legitimate authority. He stated, “my signing this resolution does not constitute any change in … the President’s constitutional authority to use force to deter, prevent, or respond to aggression or other threats to U.S. interests…”

“This is a sweeping assertion of powers that leaves out virtually nothing. It is a far different matter than repelling an immediate attack, or conducting a war that has been authorized by the Congress. Let’s just match up a couple of these words. The President is saying, for instance, that he possesses the authority to use force to “deter … threats to U.S. interests.” How do you use force to “deter” a threat, rather than preventing or responding to it? And what kind of “U.S. interest” is worthy of the use of force? And, most importantly, how do these vague terms fit into the historically accepted notions of a Commander in Chief’s power to repel attacks, or to conduct military operations once they have been approved by the Congress?

“Mr. President, during our recent hearings on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I asked both the Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary of State for clarification of this paragraph in the President’s signing statement. My question was whether this Administration believes it has the authority to conduct unilateral military operations against Iran in the absence of a direct attack or a compelling, immediate threat without the consent of the Congress. Both wrote me lengthy letters in reply, but neither could give me a clear responses. The situation that we now face is that the Administration repeatedly states that it seeks no war with Iran, at the same time it claims the authority to begin one, and at the same time it continues a military buildup in the region.

“The legislation I introduce today is intended to clarify this ambiguity. In so doing, the Congress will be properly restating its constitutional relationship with the executive branch. The Congress will be reinstituting its historical role as it relates to the conduct of foreign policy. And the Congress will be reassuring the American people that there will be no more shooting from the hip when it comes to the gravely serious question of when we send our military people into harm’s way.

“Mr. President I would like to emphasize that this bill will not take any military options off of the table. Nor will it tie the hands of the Administration if our military forces are actually attacked from Iranian soil or territorial waters, or by forces that retreat into Iranian territory. Nor does this legislation let Iran off the hook in terms of our insistence that Iran become a more responsible nation, including our positions regarding Iran’s nuclear program and Iran’s recognition of Israel’s right to exist.

“I was one of the early voices warning that in terms of national security, Iran was a far greater threat than Iraq. This was one of the reasons I opposed the invasion of Iraq in the first place. Again, all of the options regarding Iran remain on the table. The question is in what context these options should be debated, alongside other options designed to eventually open up Iran and bring it responsibly into the world community. In my view, and in terms of the constitutional process, absent a direct attack or a clearly imminent threat, the place for that debate is here in the open forum of the Congress, not in some closed-door meeting at the White House."

And yesterday, Iran Nuclear Watch posted: Military strikes could speed Iran’s development of nuclear weapons, warns new report:

Military strikes, instead of setting back Iran’s nuclear program, could actually speed up their production of a nuclear weapon, according to a new report written by one of the UK’s leading nuclear scientists published on 5 March 2007.

The report shows that following an armed attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities, Iran could change the nature of its program to assemble a small number of devices relatively quickly.


I'm not sure that I buy this argument, especially since it seems to have worked for Saddam. However, The Economist seems to think diplomacy, at least among its neighbors, will do the region some good:

Yet, away from hand-holding poses for the cameras, Mr Ahmadinejad’s brief visit to the Saudi capital was likely to have been less than harmonious. Saudi officials remain privately adamant about the need to counter what is perceived as Iran’s destabilising role in the region. The kingdom recently, for example, reasserted Arab ownership of the Palestinian issue by reconciling clashing Palestinian factions, one of which, the Islamist group Hamas, had previously turned to Iran for support. Moreover, the Saudis remain deeply sceptical of Iran’s protests that its nuclear plans are peaceful.

For its part, Iran’s government is quietly alarmed by the Saudis’ potential—as yet restrained—to make life difficult for them, for instance by directly sponsoring anti-Shia militias in Iraq and Lebanon, or Sunni separatist movements inside Iran’s own restless Khuzestan and Baluchistan provinces. The Iranians also know that if push comes to shove, the Saudis and their Arab allies in the Gulf could hurt Iran’s economy by flooding oil markets. Saudi Arabia also maintains a tight military alliance with Pakistan, a nuclear-armed Sunni state on Iran’s borders, which just happens to have tested long-range missiles lately, and to have hosted a meeting of Muslim foreign ministers that pointedly excluded Iran.

In other words, Saudi Arabia’s seemingly friendly diplomacy may actually add to, rather than reduce, the pressure on Iran to curb its regional ambitions. Later this month, the kingdom is hosting a much bigger gathering of Arab heads of state. Despite Mr Ahmadinejad’s efforts to widen his circle of friends, Iran’s allies in that meeting are likely to be few and far between.

I guess we'll see.

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