Showing posts with label Thomas P.M. Barnett. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Thomas P.M. Barnett. Show all posts

Sunday, May 17, 2009

Maybe Nukes Aren't So Bad

Thomas P.M. Barnett, writing in Esquire, is certain to make the anti-war crowd apoplectic:


George W. Bush had his "axis of evil," while Obama seems to find nuclear weapons to represent a kind of natural evil unto themselves — no matter who possesses them. Now the twentysomethings in Prague may have cheered his invocations of "hope" and "change," and others may be jumping on board, but I've discovered something in my years of global-strategy analysis, and it's not the deadly fatalism Obama describes — it's the modern realism he ignores: Nuclear weapons are the single best thing that has ever happened in mankind's long history of war.


Barnett is no raging neo-con, and he has been highly critical of Bush on more than one occasion.

Thursday, September 13, 2007

Lawrence Wright On al Qaeda

From Hugh Hewitt:

"They haven't accomplished what they hoped to do in Iraq"

But what scares him:

"There's a reason why young Saudis leave the Kingdom to go fight the Jihad. Because they would rather fight it in their own country and that's the goal of al Qaeda. They want to train these young men, and then turn them against the regimes in their own countries.

"It's a mistake for the Saudis to not clamp down much stronger on these young men who are leaving the Kingdom and then joining the Jihad, but they're in a fix. They want to show their support for the Sunnis, and the Sunnis are under attack in Iraq, and so it's a real paradox for the Saudis."

Wright brings up an idea that Thomas P.M. Barnett proposed, that the U.S. pull back from the worst part of Iraq in the hopes that the sectarian fighting between Sunni and Shi'a accelerate.

The possible intentions of al Qaeda with regard to Saudis in Iraq makes this proposition ever more of a gamble. As Dean Barnett wrote, that is Pathetic Wishful Thinking.

Monday, September 03, 2007

Three Iraq Wars

Christopher Hitchens:

When people say that they want to end the war in Iraq, I always want to ask them which war they mean. There are currently at least three wars, along with several subconflicts, being fought on Iraqi soil. The first, tragically, is the battle for mastery between Sunni and Shiite. The second is the campaign to isolate and defeat al-Qaida in Mesopotamia. The third is the struggle of Iraq's Kurdish minority to defend and consolidate its regional government in the north.


Read the rest.

Thomas P.M. Barnett agrees:
When people say surge works, they speak of AQM, and when they say it doesn't, they speak of Sunni v. Shiia.

Meanwhile. Kurdistan remains the untold success story increasingly under fire.

Wednesday, August 29, 2007

"We're not making a diplomatic surge"

Said Thomas P.M. Barnett, on Hugh Hewitt's show. Barnett was on to discuss a post on his blog which suggested that the United States allow the Sunni/Shi'a fighting to accelerate in the hopes of creating a dialogue between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Barnett, always well informed and well spoken, said a number of things, but made three essential points:

1)

We're moving in the direction... of recognizing a free Kurdistan. That war(in Kurdistan) is a complete success.


2)
The surge strategy, and I would emphasize the word strategy there ... is what has really turned the tables. There we've been successful in turning the Sunni Sheiks and tribes against al Qaeda in the region... I believe we can count that as a second success.


3)
The third one is the one that I think most people refer to when they talk about the war going badly or the surge failing: and that is, our capacity to stop Sunni on Shi'a violence... and we're nowhere near the two sides being fatigued in their fighting... I don't think the surge is going to be judged effectively in that light.

I think the real key is gonna be: Is Bush gonna bite the bullet and create a peace dialogue in the region on Iraq that gets Saudis and Iranians to the table... it's really shaping up to be a proxy war between the House of Saud and Tehran... I'd rather see the fight sped up a bit and then get them to the peace table.


Hewitt:
If we quote "speed up the battle," and that battle involves hundreds of thousands of casualties slaughtered in a genocidal conflict... don't you think that'll bankrupt our credibility in the third world?


Barnett:
We're going to get the same outcome whether it's slow motion, or whether it's fast... I'm more willing to run that risk and accept the consequences of that, then I think other people are, simply because I think it's going to happen anyway, just in a slower fashion.


Hewitt:
Is there any chance it wouldn't happen [the violence ends before we leave], I mean, You're giving up, isn't there at least some prospect?


Barnett:
I'm increasingly dissatisfied that we haven't been able to get any sort of regional peace dialogue on Iraq going... we haven't gotten the Saudis to step up whatsoever, and we're still pursuing the WMD charge with Iran, which I believe based on our intelligence is a premature fight to drag into this current issue of Iraq.


Hewitt:
If we run out on Iraq, how long will it be until another Arab people or regime trusts us on any pledge we make in the future?


Barnett:
If we can get down to half the number of troops we've got now, reman operationally efficient against al Qaeda in Iraq, and protect Kurdistan... that force can still do everything we need to do, but it would allow the dynamic of a Shi'a/Sunni fighting to either force some sort of regional peace dialogue, or we would suffer some sort of credibility loss... if we pull out completely, that's a different subject.


Hewitt:
How many casualties in that Shi'a/Sunni fight are you willing to stand by and see happen? What's the upper most limit a Western liberal democracy can stand back and watch happen?


Barnett:
It's not me, Hugh, who's going to sit back and take that quarter million [deaths], which I think is a good number, it's Bush who's doing that by refusing to engage in some serious dialogue with Iran on the subject, and really twist some arms in Riyadh on the subject.


Interesting perspective, although I don't believe anywhere near as many Iraqis will die in the long term if we stay in Iraq with a large troop presence, compared to the significant draw down Dr. Barnett is proposing.

I also believe it's a huge gamble. If America pulls out of the central fight between Sunni's and Shi'a, and a holocaust ensues... what if the killings do not prompt a dialogue between Iran and Saudi Arabia? What if U.S. credibility does suffer an even greater blow than it has already?

Barnett responds to his interview with Hugh Hewitt here.

Wednesday, June 06, 2007

Iraq, Experience & Reenlistment

Random Thoughts from Outside The Wire:

More of the grunts are reenlisting than I expected. A lot of the guys are ready to do their four and hit the door, but there are more sticking around than I expected at this point.

The Army sure does have a lot of Sergeants and Staff Sergeants--way more than the Marines.

The infantrymen are universally amazing. Even the few who have decided the work is not for them and hate Iraq and the military still do the job well and have not slacked off.

This current crop of Company and Battalion commanders could be one of the best ever. Nearly every company commander in theater has already been a platoon commander in combat. Most of the Battalion commanders have been here previously on a Battalion or Regimental staff.

I ask the officers: "When you joined, did you ever think you would be--acting as a city manager, provincial governor, village sheriff, mediator between tribes, spending so much time talking with the locals?"

They all say no.

They're all doing yeoman's work out there for us.

And as I quoted Tom Donnelly last week, JD Johannes also sounds like Thomas P.M. Barnett when discussing the need for military transformation. Maybe he read The Pentagon's New Map.

Thursday, May 31, 2007

Our 21st Century Military Needs

Tom Donnelly writes of The Army We Need

Given the number and variety of missions and the emerging nature of land war, it is apparent that U.S. land forces need not only to be more numerous but also to reflect capabilities beyond simply the timely and devastating delivery of firepower. If the Pentagon's transformation model was geared for rapid, decisive operations, our post-9/11 experience tells us there will be no one-battle war. The conflicts we face are more like the frontier fighting of the 19th century--in the American West but also in the far-flung outposts of the British Empire--than the epic clashes of European armies in the 20th century.

He often sounds like Thomas P.M. Barnett.

More on the state of our military and what we need to do in order to improve it for the conflicts we expect to face from the tank at NRO.

Yet more from the tank at NRO on U.S. Defense Spending: Myths and Facts.

Monday, April 30, 2007

The Question of America's Involvement in the World

Someone recently gave me his opinion of what America's role in the world should be, and how he thought we were overstepping our bounds, getting too involved in world affairs, and doing more harm than good:

We have enough to worry about within our own borders to run around wearing ourselves out with other's problems. I think our actions abroad only stimulate the hatred and act as catalysts to these anarchist groups that act in the name of Jihad. If we focused on gathering intelligence and self preservation, rather than aggressive imposition of our values, we would be safer, richer and in better favor with the rest of the planet. Yes, that would create more of a "have and have-nots" situation, but no more than we already have.

Isolationism versus engagement, passivity versus action, the status quo versus progress. The United States has wrestled with this issue throughout its history, and the debate continues in these troubled times. It is a difficult question, one that certainly evokes strong emotions among many people. But as usual, Thomas P.M. Barnett does an excellent job explaining why the latter position should be the only course of action.

I would surmise that there are three basic responses most people advocate when confronted with the Core-Gap thesis (Core=1st world, modern, peaceful countries; Gap=3rd world poor, undemocratic, chaotic, dangerous countries). The first basic response I would locate on the left, or liberal, end of the political spectrum. What these people are most upset about is the notion that the U.S. military is clearly headed toward "perpetual war" all over the Gap, which in their minds will only make things worse there. They advocate a sort of Hippocratic, "do no harm" approach that readily admits that the Core is largely to blame for the Gap's continuing misery and therefore should rescue those in pain, bu do so primarily through state-based foreign aid and private charities. The "do no harm" aspect refers to their strong desire to see America bring its military forces back home and stop all these military interventions overseas, the underlying assumption being that fewer military interventions on our part would actually improve the international security situation by not scaring our allies so.

The second basic approach is simply to say, "That's the way things are" and to blame the Gap for its own problems. These responses came more from the right or conservative end of the political spectrum. These writers' basic point is that the Gap is not America's problem and that if we make it so, we will eventually end up running some "empire" that will corrupt both our souls and our political system... the more mainstream response from the right focuses on the notion that shrinking the Gap is simply too big a problem for the United States to take on-militarily or otherwise. Instead, they bluntly advocate a sort of civilizational apartheid that strikes me as a mirror image of what I believe many violent anti globalization forces would also prefer-including Osama bin Laden. Rather than fix the Gap, these respondents prefer segregation. The most common way this gets expressed is the idea that if America would only end its dependence on foreign oil, illegal narcotics, and cheap immigrant labor, we could just build a big fence around this nasty neighborhood called the Gap and not have to deal with it anymore. People who advocate this twenty-first-century form of isolationism do not argue so much for pulling our military forces home as positioning them around the Gap as a sort of global border patrol, making sure the bad stuff stays in the Gap...

Then there are those who have written in agreement. These respondents see both a moral culpability on the part of the Core and a moral responsibility on the part of the sole surviving super-power, the United States, to shrink the Gap by all means possible-including the use of force in the worst situations. This moderate middle views the Gaps plight more pragmatically, citing the history of past colonialism by Core states in terms of both the good and bad legacies, the right and wrong lessons to be drawn, and their underlying optimism that America-always the reluctant imperialist-would do better than those European powers had in centuries past. The only morality these moderates touched upon was the immorality of doing nothing.

...Like the Cold War containment theorists, I believe it is essential that we be honest with ourselves about the world we live in, and to me, that means-first and foremost-that we identify the sources of mass violence in the system and work to progressively shrink those sources... "shrinking the gap" as a strategic vision is not about making amends for the past. Instead, it is a practical strategy for dealing with the present danger that will-on regular occasion, I believe-reach into our good life and cause us much pain if we continue to ignore it. But more than just looking out for ourselves, shrinking the Gap is a strategy that also speaks to a better future for that roughly one-third of humanity that continues to live and die in the Gap.

- Dr. Thomas P.M. Barnett, The Pentagon's New Map, p 159.

Saturday, April 21, 2007

The Argument for The War In Iraq

The debate over whether to stay in Iraq is raging on Capitol Hill. Most Democrats are in favor of either an immediate pullout, a measured pullout, steady de-funding of the war, or total de-funding, depending on which politician you are talking about. Besides, their stance changes every day.

Republicans have fallen from the Hagel "the president can sign a war-funding bill that gives our troops the resources they need and places responsible conditions on that funding that will press the Iraqi government to perform and make the tough choices," to the Mitch McConnell "A war spending bill that includes such a date is no war spending bill at all — it’s a prolonged and costly notice of surrender" variety.

To illustrate the debate, the following is an imaginary conversation between the 'surrender monkeys,' and the 'hawkish (realist) eagles':

Surrender Monkeys: We have to pull out of Iraq now, because we are losing, the surge isn't working! Harry Reid just told us that "The Iraq war... is lost." Not to mention Barack Obama: "I don't think there are any good options left in Iraq. There are bad options and worse options.''




Hawkish Eagles: Actually, Iraqi civilian deaths are down 45% since the surge began, so I'm not sure what you mean by "we are losing." Where are you even getting your facts from?







Surrender Monkeys: Fine, you can have your numbers! But the Iraqi people don't want us there! Why should we help them if they don't want our help?










Hawkish Eagles: You're right, they don't want us there. If by they, you mean the terrorists. Actually, the Iraqi people do want us there. Ask the Kurds. Ask the Sunni's in al-anbar province. Ask the average Iraqi.






Surrender Monkeys: But the Iraqi government is not doing its job! If they're not going to do their job, why should we help them? Maliki is in bed with Sadr, he only cares about his fellow Shi'ites. If he doesn't meet these benchmarks, and he hasn't, then we should pull out.




Hawkish Eagles: Actually, Maliki has taken significant steps to curtail militants. Furthermore, U.S. and Iraqi troops have recently moved into Sadr city in force. Also, if the Iraqis aren't meeting these "benchmarks" you propose, wouldn't that mean they need more help rather than less help? Would that not mean we should logically stick with them until they fix their broken country? In any case, Secretary of Defense Gates has told the Iraqi government that the 'clock is ticking.'



Surrender Monkeys: But Iraq is just a civil war! Why are we involved in another country's civil war? We never should have invaded in the first place. It has nothing to do with the war on terrorism!










Hawkish Eagles: You are confusing the issues. Whether or not we should have invaded is one issue, and for now, we have bigger problems, so let it go. Second, Iraq is not simply a civil war. That description would be to grossly under-estimate what is happening on the ground. In Iraq, you have Sunn's attacking Shi'ites, but you also have Sunni's attacking each other. Al Qaeda is warring with Sunni Shieks, but they are also split amongst themselves. Shi'ite factions are also split, and subject to internal quarrels within their own neighborhoods. Add to that various other foreign fighters, not to mention Iranian meddling, and the picture begins to look much more complicated, does it not? With all these insurgents and terrorists running around in Iraq from all over the region, doesn't that sound like part of the war on terror to you?

Surrender Monkeys: Our presence in Iraq is causing the terrorists to attack us and to foment civil war. If we leave, the violence might well just decrease.







Hawkish Eagles: Might? There is no evidence to support that. In fact, it is almost certain that the violence would intensify, given the fact that American soldiers would not be present to serve as a buffer between not only insurgent factions, but the Iraqi Army and Police, who are often at odds with each other. Besides, how long did we stay in Germany after the Second World War? We're still there! I don't hear you arguing or protesting about our presence in Germany. And how about South Korea? Japan? Those are all stable countries now, aren't they? In fact, each country has blossomed under American protected democracy.

Surrender Monkeys: Come on! The Iraq war is different from all those wars. How can you even compare one war with another! Besides, Iraq is definitely worse than Vietnam!






Hawkish Eagles: Didn't you just say I shouldn't compare wars? Worse than Vietnam? Please. A cursory glance at the number of U.S. fatalities within the same time-period alone proves your theory wrong. In Vietnam, over 58,000 American lives were lost, and as many as 4 million Vietnamese civilians. Still worse than Vietnam? You shouldn't utter such hollow platitudes without any further evidence or introspection.



Surrender Monkeys: The U.S. isn't even in Iraq to help the Iraqi's. This was an war for oil and money to feed our massive Military-Industrial Complex!




Hawkish Eagles: I suppose you are entitled to your opinion, even though there is virtually no way to prove what you are saying. Speaking of money, who profited from Saddam staying in power? Consider all the Iraq war opponents overseas. Besides, many reconstruction contracts have been awarded to foreign companies.


Surrender Monkeys: But we didn't even get approval from the U.N. to invade Iraq! This was not a multilateral effort. We can't behave like a bunch of drunken cowboys. We're not alone in the world, and the opinion of our allies affects our soft power.





Hawkish Eagles: No U.N. approval? Not a multilateral effort? Did Bill Clinton obtain U.N. approval for Kosovo? Did we not go to war with Britain, Italy, Australia and a host of other allies? Wouldn't two or more allies constitute a 'multilateral' effort? Speaking of the U.N., didn't they make out like bandits, profiting from the Iraqi Oil for Food scandal?



Surrender Monkeys: Bottom line, we shouldn't be getting involved in another country's problems!

Hawkish Eagles: That view failed in 1914 [WW I], 1941 [WW II], 1950 [Korean War], 1991 [First Gulf War], and 1999 [Kosovo War] (to name a few), and it fails today.

Surrender Monkeys: What gives us the right to enter other countries, anyway? The Iraqis did not attack us, it was the terrorists. We're acting like an imperialist empire!


Hawkish Eagles: If other nations are harboring terrorists and providing safe haven, are they not accomplices? Besides, I have already said that this is not a debate about the justification for the Iraq War, this is about pulling out of Iraq now. But to your point, how many attacks were perpetrated upon us by terrorists and their terrorist-sponsored states before the United States took action? The first World Trade Center attack? The Khobar Towers? The U.S. African embassy attacks? The attack on the USS Cole? 9/11? The Madrid Bombings? The London Bombings? How many attacks do we have to suffer before we can fight back? And did you say imperialist? Allow me to let Dr. Thomas P.M. Barnett reply, from page 119 of his book, "The Pentagon's New Map,":

"Countries seem to switch sides these days at the drop of a hat - or perhaps just a hint. Think about our secretaries of state jetting around the world trying to get all sorts of small powers to subscribe to our latest public offering, promising this or that aid package in return. What kind of "imperialist power" has to go around begging every little country sitting on the UN Security Council to let it - pretty please - invade some country and topple its horrible leader that nobody likes? Does that seem a dignified way to run a world empire?"

Surrender Monkeys: We can't win this guerrilla war in Iraq! It's not possible!

Hawkish Eagles: Oh no? What about the French in Algeria? The Colombians? (With U.S. support), The British over the IRA? Spain and ETA? Russia and Chechnya? The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt?

Surrender Monkeys: Look at the terrorist attacks of this week! Almost 200 dead in one day! It's getting worse! Basically, we and the Iraqi people are suffering due to our involvement there.

Hawkish Eagles: You can either look at one day, one snapshot in time, OR you can take in the full spectrum of events from the past four year, look at them inside and out, combine that with the global jihadist movement, security policy, etc. and then make a decision. I see that you're taking the former approach.

Surrender Monkeys: We're fighting in Iraq, but look at all the suffering around the world, like in Sudan!

Hawkish Eagles: Didn't you say we shouldn't get involved in other country's problems? Besides, what make the Sudanese more deserving than the Iraqi's? If you ask Barack Obama, Senator Joseph Biden, and Hollywood, then the answer is yes, we should help go help Sudan. But those same people want us out of Iraq. Should we trade one Civil War for another?

Surrender Monkeys: Just as bad as the Iraq war, we're illegally holding combatants in Guantanamo Bay! Their Geneva Convention rights are being stripped away from them!

Hawkish Eagles: Oh, really? Are you aware that a number of those GITMO prisoners that we have released have been killed or captured after joining with terrorist groups again after they were released from Guantanamo Bay? Do you know that the wealthy families of many of these "prisoners" have hired an American law firm to defend their sons AND to launch a PR campaign to help obfuscate their crimes, and hyper-inflate the "crimes" being perpetrated upon them? They are supplied with "Harry Potter" books, how bad do you think it really is for them?

Surrender Monkeys: But what do we even have to show for the war in Iraq, or the war on terrorsim, for that matter? We're clearly losing!

Hawkish Eagles: What do we have to show? We're losing? We've caught or captured 90% of al Qaeda's leadership, Zarqawi, Hussein, his sons, his secondaries, Khalid Sheik Mohammed, and countless others. We kill 20 of them for every one of our troops, especially in Afghanistan. Those aren't accomplishments? Not to mention we have not been attacked again at home since 9/11. Let's go one step further - Internet subscribers in Iraq have gone from 4,500 prewar, to 197,000 today. What does that tell you? Independent newspapers went from 0 to 268 today. Freedom of speech is on the march. Not only are Iraqi civilian deaths down, but the number of Iraqi civilians killed by U.S. troops is also down 25% from January 2006. We like to call This progress:

The movement of thousands of terrorist personnel from Baghdad resulted in many of them being caught or killed. In the last two months, three senior al Qaeda leaders have been caught, and over 500 terrorists killed or captured. Lots of documents and other evidence was also scooped up, and many of the captured terrorists are in a talkative mood. Sunni Arabs are showing the effects of four years on-the-run. While many of the captured terrorists express despair, and believe they have no choice but to fight to the end, they do seek a less dismal outcome. But Sunni Arabs in general know that the majority of Iraqis hate them, mainly for what Saddam and his crew did. While Saddam was in power, the Sunni Arabs prospered, and everyone else suffered. Now it's time for payback.

What is right is not always popular, and what is popular is not always right. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Unknown
We sleep peacably in our beds at night only because rough men stand read to do violence on our behalf." ~ George Orwell
For Victor [and Bill]

Saturday, April 14, 2007

Explaining the Terrorist Enemy

Thomas P.M. Barnett explains how and why terrorism is fostered:

The fact that we did invade Afghanistan should tell us plenty about the ultimate enemy that we face - disconnectedness. When Vladimir Lenin wanted to create the world's first socialist state in defiance of the capitalist world system he ended up in Russia, a nation whose economic development was significantly retarded - or precapitalist. Correspondingly, when bin Laden and al Qaeda sought to launch their worldwide resistance to the United States-led globalization process, they invariably settled in a nation whose economic connectivity to the outside world was severely retarded - or preglobalized. - The Pentagon's New Map, p. 94

Friday, April 13, 2007

American Threats - Barnett

"The future," Thomas P.M. Barnett has written, is "not about dealing with the biggest threat in the environment, but dealing with the environment of threats."

- The Pentagon's New Map, p. 69

This environment of threats includes radical Islamic terrorists in Iraq. They pose a threat to Iraq's stability, to the region's stability, and to world energy stability. These mass murderers use a variety of terror tactics, and they are not above leveraging innocent children:

Here is the latest example of this new form of evil as reported by the Associated Press: "Maj. Gen. Michael Barbero, deputy director for regional operations on the Joint Staff, said . . . the vehicle used in the attack [on Iraqi civilians] was waved through a U.S. military checkpoint because two children were visible in the back seat. He said this was the first reported use of children in a car bombing in Baghdad. 'Children in the back seat lowered suspicion, (so) we let it move through, they parked the vehicle, the adults run out and detonate it with the children in the back,' Barbero told reporters in Washington."

This environment of threats includes a rouge Iranian regime bent on developing and sharing nuclear technology [Iran offers to share nuclear expertise with GCC states], controlling the region [Bush: We won't let Iran control the region], working to destroy democratic Israel [Israel should be wiped off map, says Iran's president], and funding sectarian strife in Iraq [U.S. Suspects That Iran Aids Both Sunni and Shiite Militias].

This environment of threats includes an Iranian regime that is already well on its way to developing nuclear weapons:


Suppose that upon entering Iraq, our troops had uncovered a nuclear facility in which Saddam had 1,000 working centrifuges, another 2,000 about to come on line, and manufacturing capacity to produce yet more centrifuges? Would anyone have argued at that point that the invasion had been unnecessary? Do any Democrats deny that Iran does in fact have all of this capacity right now?

In the debate to come over Iran’s nuclear capacity, there will be constant references to our intelligence failure in Iraq. The dispute will be about exactly how close Iran is to a bomb. But let no one forget that Iran is already at a point that would easily have justified the overthrow of Saddam. This fact, by itself, does not decide the issue of what to do about Iran. An attack on Iran would be militarily tougher than the invasion of Iraq. Occupation of Iran seems out of the question. There are also questions about how far an attack would actually set back Iran’s nuclear program. Yet all of these difficulties and considerations notwithstanding, the fact is, we are under a threat of exactly the sort that everyone agreed would justify action in Iraq.

This environment of threats includes Syria, a country that collaborates with Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas to foment civil strife and encourage terror. Syria, the same country recently visited by the benevolent U.S. Secretary of S- er, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi:



The result of the Pelosi trip on Middle Eastern reformists is having quite a chilling effect. Five years of investment by the US State Department and the Bush administration in organizations and people who have committed their lives to helping their oppressed countries is being flushed away by the Democrats in Congress who, with the visit of Pelosi to Syria, have shown that they favor the stability of dictatorships to freedom even if they had a direct hand in killing American troops in Iraq.

For Nancy Pelosi to cajole with Assad who has facilitated the killing of American soldiers is a travesty. RPS wants to remind all the Democrats in Congress what Assad has been up to in building terrorist bases in Syria. Many of the Democrats already know it because they get the same good intelligence as the National Security Council or the DIA. The US public has not been informed of these training terrorist bases because the media is disinterested in highlighting any reason that would prompt Bush to take action. Without public support, the US can never achieve success in the hard and long struggle to subdue extremism and to spread freedom.


There is much more to Mideast policy than cherry-picking allies, especially for domestic political reasons. Relationships between the United States and regional powers in the Middle East (such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan) have been carefully developed for decades with great care and diligence by successive administrations. A week-long "fact-finding" mission, simultaneously botching a message from Israel and seemingly handing a degree of legitimacy to a pariah state (Syria), does not serve the long-term strategic interest of the United States.

It should also be seen as an embarrassment that the Top Iran MP wants talks with US House speaker Pelosi:


A top MP said on Friday the Tehran parliament would favour talks with US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi after her controversial visit to Iran's ally Syria, the semi-official Fars news agency reported.


"We are ready for talks with US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi," said Mohammad Nabi Rudaki, deputy head of the influential national security commission in Iran's conservative-dominated parliament.


It is a shocking and worrisome shift that an Iranian official would solicit dialogue to the Speaker of the House, entirely bypassing all traditional, customary and appropriate norms in relation to diplomatic protocol. Imagine if Tony Blair's foreign secretary, Margaret Beckett, was upstaged and circumvented by a Tory Minister. Imagine that all established, codified and practiced rules of government were nullified through a series of irresponsible politicking.


That is what's going on right now.

Monday, March 26, 2007

The audacity of hoping for defeat in Iraq

"I don't think there are any good options left in Iraq,'' said Sen. Barack Obama, the Illinois Democrat running for president. "There are bad options and worse options.''

Hope does not apply to Iraq, if you listen to some. Hope is contingent on a series of cherry-picked domestic policies that will appear to a very specific constituency.

However, hope can be found. CBS/AP reported that Civilian Deaths In Iraq Drop Overnight.

The number of Iraqi civilians killed in Baghdad's sectarian violence fell drastically overnight, an Iraqi military official said Friday, crediting the joint U.S.-Iraqi security operation that began in force just days ago.

More hope from The Philadelphia Inquirer, One Last Thing 'Surge' cuts killings in Baghdad:

The Baghdad Security Plan went into effect Feb. 14, as Gen. David Petraeus assumed command over coalition forces in Iraq. The idea was to push five additional U.S. brigades and nine Iraqi battalions into neighborhoods in and around Baghdad, establishing secure points and radiating security outward.

Some results were seen almost immediately. In the first two weeks of the plan, bomb attacks decreased 20 percent and insurgents were being rolled up by the dozen. The number of bodies of apparently murdered people in Baghdad dropped from 1,222 in December to 954 in January and 494 in February. The Iraqi government stepped up its training of troops to the point at which it was minting 7,500 new soldiers every five weeks, most of whom were being used to spell Iraq army units already in Baghdad.

That's not all:

The impact is striking: According to Iraqi military spokesman Brig. Gen. Qassim Atta al-Mussawi, in the first month of the Baghdad Security Plan, while the number of car-bomb incidents was at an all-time high, murders were down 75 percent, the number of terrorists killed was up 80 percent, and the number of terrorists arrested was up 1,000 percent. (U.S. military deaths were down 20 percent.)
Bush made a change, namely, removing Rumsfeld:

But the Baghdad Security Plan does provide clarity on one point: former Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld. Rumsfeld was a principal objectors to the large-scale use of troops from the beginning of the Iraq conflict. He insisted on a small invasion force and was adamant that troop levels during the reconstruction phase be kept to a "small footprint" ideal, even as the security situation deteriorated and threatened to doom the mission. Rumsfeld was opposed to any surge in troop levels.

Meanwhile, as columnist Andrew Cockburn recently revealed, back at the Pentagon this petty tyrant was busy sending around "snowflakes" - informal personal notes - dictating a host of micromanagerial issues, including the proper size of the lemon wedge to accompany his iced tea.

Wait, there's more hope... Iraq's Sunni sheiks join Americans to fight insurgency

RAMADI, Iraq – Not long ago it would have been unthinkable: a Sunni sheik allying himself publicly with American forces in a xenophobic city at the epicenter of Iraq's Sunni insurgency.

Today, there is no mistaking whose side Sheik Abdul Sattar al-Rishawi is on. Outside his walled home, a U.S. tank is on permanent guard beside a clutch of towering date palms and a protective dirt berm.

Thomas P.M. Barnett, the preeminent military strategist and renowned Pentagon expert, adds to this positive thinking in a post on his blog titled, History will say on postwar Iraq...

Cool blog post on traveling to Kurdistan today versus year ago. Our most
successful nation-building effort since German and Japan--a huge success, in fact.
Oh the audacity!

Armed with such positive news, throw in a little hope, mix it around, add a little will to win, and we arrive at Bill Kristol & Fred Kagan's Wrong on Timetables:

Democrats in Congress have made three superficially plausible claims: (1) Benchmarks and timetables will "incentivize" the Maliki government to take necessary steps it would prefer to avoid. (2) We can gradually withdraw over the next year so as to step out of sectarian conflict in Iraq while still remaining to fight al Qaeda. (3) Defeat in Iraq is inevitable, so our primary goal really has to be to get out of there. But the situation in Iraq is moving rapidly away from the assumptions underlying these propositions, and their falseness is easier to show with each passing day.

and

(1) The Iraqi government will not act responsibly unless the imminent departure of American forces compels it to do so. In fact, since January 11, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki has permitted U.S. forces to sweep the major Shiite strongholds in Baghdad, including Sadr City, which he had ordered American troops away from during operations in 2006. He has allowed U.S. forces to capture and kill senior leaders of Moktada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army--terrifying Sadr into fleeing to Iran. He fired the deputy health minister--one of Sadr's close allies--and turned a deaf ear to Sadr's complaints. He oversaw a clearing-out of the Interior Ministry, a Sadrist stronghold that was corrupting the Iraqi police. He has worked with coalition leaders to deploy all of the Iraqi Army units required by the Baghdad Security Plan. In perhaps the most dramatic move of all, Maliki visited Sunni sheikhs in Ramadi, the capital of Anbar province and formerly the base of al Qaeda fighters and other Sunni Arab insurgents against his government.

(2) American forces would be able to fight al Qaeda at least as well, if not better, if they were not also engaged in a sectarian civil war in Iraq. The idea of separating the fight against al Qaeda from the sectarian fighting in Iraq is a delusion.

(3) Isn't it too late? Even if we now have the right strategy and the right general, can we prevail? If there were no hope left, if the Iraqis were determined to wage full-scale civil war, if the Maliki government were weak or dominated by violent extremists, if Iran really controlled the Shiites in Iraq--if these things were true, then the new strategy would have borne no fruit at all.

Hope is not victory, of course. The surge has just begun, our enemies are adapting, and fighting is likely to intensify as U.S. and Iraqi forces begin the main clear-and-hold phase. The Maliki government could falter. But it need not, if we do not.

The most drastic sign of hope does not come from Iraq, but from the pages of the Washington Post. When the Washington Post calls out the Democrats, a watershed moment has arrived: Retreat and Butter

The Democrats claim to have a mandate from voters to reverse the Bush administration's policy in Iraq. Yet the leadership is ready to piece together the votes necessary to force a fateful turn in the war by using tactics usually dedicated to highway bills or the Army Corps of Engineers budget. The legislation pays more heed to a handful of peanut farmers than to the 24 million Iraqis who are living through a maelstrom initiated by the United States, the outcome of which could shape the future of the Middle East for decades.

Congress can and should play a major role in determining how and when the war ends. Political benchmarks for the Iraqi government are important, provided they are not unrealistic or inflexible. Even dates for troop withdrawals might be helpful, if they are cast as goals rather than requirements -- and if the timing derives from the needs of Iraq, not the U.S. election cycle. The Senate's version of the supplemental spending bill for Iraq and Afghanistan contains nonbinding benchmarks and a withdrawal date that is a goal; that approach is more likely to win broad support and avoid a White House veto.

Kevin McCullough also asks: Why do Democrats crave defeat?

In their own echo-chamber vanity Murtha, Pelosi and company believe themselves to be smarter than the commanders of the operations in the war on terror. And they believe that we will sit mesmerized, like sheep, while they single-handedly attempt to give the terrorists a date for victory - August 31, 2008.

Ouch.

However, let's be Prudent, as the Economist cautions in Counting the Cost:

FEW will celebrate the fourth anniversary of America's invasion of Iraq on Tuesday March 20th. It was supposed to serve as an example of how to build democracy in the Middle East, but turned into a model for how to wreck a country. It was meant to give warning to rogue regimes and instead strengthened radical states such as Syria and Iran. It was intended to confront Islamist extremism at its source, but intensified the appeal of global jihad. It was planned as a demonstration of America’s global power, but ended up sapping its military might in a debilitating insurgency.

Even the final demise of Saddam Hussein, one of the vilest dictators in the world, went wrong. He maintained a striking self-composure in the face of sectarian jeering when he went to the gallows in December. The justifications for the war have collapsed. The pre-invasion rationale was to rid Saddam of weapons of mass destruction, but none were found. The post-invasion objective was the promotion of democracy, but this has fed sectarian tensions in Iraq and led to the rise of Islamists elsewhere, such as Hamas in the Palestinian territories. All that is left is President George Bush’s argument that however grim the situation may appear now, it would be grimmer still if America withdrew and abandoned the country to jihadists.

However, victory cannot be achieved by reflecting on our mistakes and wallowing in self-pity. Similarly, it will not, I guarantee you, be achieved through the appropriation of our bombastic media-centric emotions by the likes of "celebrity" activists, such as Cindy Sheehan, a woman who has not found time to place a headstone on the grave of her fallen son.

Cindy Sheehan is full of audacity, but like Barack Obama, seems to be suffering from a dearth of hope.

Monday, March 05, 2007

Barnett/Hewitt, Part 8

The 8th and final installment of Hugh Hewitt's series of interviews with Thomas P.M. Barnett is now available on Townhall.com here. If you have not yet had a chance to listen, it's never too late to start. The series ends with analysis of the current state of world affairs, and cautious pragmatism for the future. Notably, Barnett describes China's growing influence in Africa.

The respect and admiration Hewitt has for Barnett is telling, given his tendency to defer to him, a quality you don't always see displayed by Hewitt, who is a seasoned, and very opinionated commentator.

Obama's shrewdness
On a side note, I've posted recently on Senator Obama's tough talk about Iran, and defense of Israel. It persistently struck me that a liberal Senator used such tough rhetoric, but then something I came across today put it in all in perspective. On Thomas Barnett's website, he writes of a meeting with Mark Lippert, Senator Obama's foreign policy adviser. It seems that Barnett has been imparting some wisdom on the Obama campaign, and it seems to be paying off.

Wednesday, February 14, 2007

Barnett: The Ten Truths

From Chapter Four of Hugh Hewitt's series with Dr. Thomas Barnett:

"I would say the big punch we pack continues to be that we can reach out and basically turn your country into a parking lot at any time."

And his Ten Truths:
  1. Look for resources and ye shall find them
  2. No stability no markets
  3. No growth not stability
  4. No resources no growth
  5. No infrastructure no resources
  6. No money no infrastructure
  7. No rules no money
  8. No security no rules
  9. No leviathan no security
  10. No will no leviathan

Thomas Barnett, Parts 5 & 6

If you have not been following the Dr. Thomas P.M. Barnett series on the Hugh Hewitt show, the Pentagon's New Map, it's never too late to start.

Part five:
Length: 00:35:06


Part six:
Length: 00:35:17

Monday, February 12, 2007

Barnett makes a good point

This quote from Thomas P.M. Barnett, author of "The Pentagon's New Map," on the Hugh Hewitt Radio Show:


"Let me give you one simple rule for my grand strategy: In a long war, you need to maximize your definition of friends, and you need to minimize -meaning, be very discrete, focused on your definition of enemies. My main complaint with the Bush administration is, they've made way too many enemies, and not enough friends."

Monday, February 05, 2007

The Pentagon's New Map: Thomas P.M. Barnett


For anyone interested in the modern evolution of the America military, strategic thinking, and the direction our government and political leaders are heading in, (or should be heading in), Hugh Hewitt's eight part series of interviews with Thomas P.M. Barnett, author of The Pentagon's New Map, is a must. They are four chapters in so far.


Links:
Length: 00:35:16


Length: 00:34:18


Length: 00:35:14


Length: 00:35:20

Sunday, January 14, 2007

Dr. Thomas Barnett on 'Rule Sets'

This excerpt of Thomas Barnett is from an interview on the Hugh Hewitt Show from January 10th, 2007:


HH: What are rule sets? And why are they changing?

TB: Well, my use of the term rule set is just a way of kind of bundling up the notion that that…for any activity, you know, human life, American football, the U.S. legal system, how you run a business, there are rules connected to that activity. Some of them are formal, the ones that get written down, some of them are informal, the kind of conventional wisdom and the insider knowledge that everybody has. And what I argue is, when rule sets get out of whack in the world, that’s when you have security issues and danger, and you tend to have war, to kind of, in many ways, seek equilibrium. My definition of the 90’s, and in effect, what went wrong with it, what it got us, sort of the 9/11 shock to the system, is that economic rule sets raced ahead of political rule sets. And technological rule sets raced ahead of security rule sets. We connected up the world as a whole in terms of economics and technology and networks faster than our political understanding and our security understanding could keep pace. And so vulnerabilities were created. An extreme vulnerability was revealed, for example, on 9/11, in terms of a very deliberate attack against our infrastructure. And what it did was not only create the damage on the ground right there, 9/11, New York City, Washington, D.C., but it sent huge repercussions, such repercussions throughout our systems in terms of the psychic damage, and the sense of vulnerability created, that we created, in effect, a rule set reset. We said oh my God, we don’t have enough rules in this area and that area, so we started making rules like crazy, very fast. We slapped one together domestically. We call it the Patriot Act. And Bush proposed one internationally. He called it the law of preemption, in effect, okay? And both of them were trying to define a new minimum standard for stability.

HH: And they have not yet been bought into by the rest of the West, or the connected core, much less the disconnected gap?

TB: Well, and it’s because we have to acknowledge the notion, and it’s an argument I make in the second book, Blueprint For Action, that we really have to contextualize the employment of that awesome power known as the U.S. Military. We’ve been entrusted dramatically, I would argue, since the end of the Cold War, with having the world’s sole military superpower status. Nobody’s really trying to build a force that’s anywhere close to our reach and our firepower and our capacity to roam the world and wage war at will. But in exchange for allowing us to keep that disproportional status, we have to submit to some larger understanding of it’s under these conditions you get to use that tremendous power, and it needs to be some understanding as to what the repercussions and what the responsibilities of not just the United States, but other advanced powers to deal with the aftermath of that kind of situation. That’s the rule set that hasn’t emerged yet, although we’re getting closer.